How to do a security audit of a Railway app?

Why a Railway-specific audit (not a generic web audit)

A generic OWASP audit will tell you your Railway app "needs CSP headers." A Railway-aware audit tells you that your specific Railway app has an RPC function callable without auth or a service key in a client bundle — the issues that actually appear when Railway apps get compromised. The difference in output value is why the audit should be scoped to Railway's real failure modes.

Step 1 — Fingerprint the deployment

Confirm the Railway stack components: database (postgres, mongodb), hosting, auth provider, third-party integrations. For Railway apps this is often visible in the Postgres endpoint URL in network requests. Document every component — each is an independent audit target.

Step 2 — Automated scan with Railway-aware rules

Run VAS against the deployed URL. The scan probes the specific issue classes found in Railway apps: secrets management, database security, network config, container security. This is the 80/20 — most critical and high findings surface here. Fix anything critical before continuing to manual steps.

Step 3 — Manual row-level policies or server-side authorization middleware review

Review the data-layer authorization code. Every API handler that touches user data must verify the authenticated user against the record owner — no exceptions. Automated tests for each endpoint as unauthenticated / as wrong-user are the cleanest way to enforce this.

Step 4 — Authentication & authorization probing

Test every endpoint with no session (expect 401), with a valid session for a different user (expect 403 on user-owned resources), and with session tokens that have been tampered with (expect 401 if signatures are enforced). Rate limiting on login/password-reset is a pass/fail check here, not a nuance.

Step 5 — Re-scan to verify

Fix findings in severity order (critical → high → medium → low), re-scan after each batch of fixes. "I applied the fix" is not evidence — the fix might not have been deployed, might have been partial, or might have been reverted. Only the scan output proves the gap is closed. Log each finding + fix + verification scan for compliance records.

Railway-specific checks often missed

• Public Database Endpoints (fix: Enable Private Networking for all database connections)
• Connection String Logging (fix: Never console)
• Shared Infrastructure Risks (fix: Use paid tier for production)
• Auto-Deploy Without Review (fix: Enable branch protection)